editorial comment hey, paraphernalia used that Einstein's quote first (well, fine, it was used by a NYT writer too). In any case, Plan Colombia is a success as defined by Rice. Effective means that it gives her more money. Effective indeed!

Albert Einstein defined insanity as "doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results." If he were alive today, he would consider US policy toward Colombia insane.

Last week, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited Colombia, the region's largest recipient of US aid, where she praised Plan Colombia as "very successful." In 2000, Congress passed "Plan Colombia" with the stated purpose of reducing the supply of cocaine to the US. Five years and $4 billion later (80 percent, or $3.2 billion, of which went to Colombian military), Plan Colombia is set to expire. But the Bush Administration has already requested $600 million in the budget to continue funding it. As Rice said on her visit to Colombia, "You don't stop in midstream on something that has been very effective."

But exactly how "effective" has Plan Colombia been? Before the American people are asked to continue spending $2 million a day on aid to Colombia, they should take a closer at the Plan.

If Plan Colombia was intended to reduce the supply of cocaine, raise its cost, and therefore, cut the numbers of users, then the program has been a costly failure. After five years, the price of cocaine is lower, and the number of cocaine users is growing. According to a recent unclassified report from the National Drug Intelligence Center, "key indicators of domestic cocaine availability show stable or slightly increased availability in drug markets throughout the country."

Plan Colombia's failure to reduce the supply of cocaine to the US should not be surprising. We have years of experience and mountains of studies that should lead us to not expect otherwise. Since 1980, the US has spent nearly $45 billion on stemming the flow of illicit drugs into the country. Illicit drug prices have dropped dramatically over that period.

In 1994, the US Army and the Office of National Drug Control Policy commissioned a RAND study, which concluded that treatment for heavy cocaine users is twenty-three times more effective than drug crop eradication and other source-country programs. The study recommended that "if an additional dollar is going to be spent on drug control, it should be spent on treatment, not on a supply-control program."

In other words, the billions spent on aid to Colombia would be better spent on providing treatment to the millions of drug abusers in the US who need treatment, but do not receive it. That money could prevent drug abuse through education as well as address the social conditions, like poverty and unemployment, which make communities vulnerable to high rates of drug abuse.

Instead, the US has funded war in Colombia, exacerbating the human rights and humanitarian crisis there. In February, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights reported that, "the human rights situation continued to be critical. There was an increase in reports of extrajudicial executions attributed to members of the security forces and other public officials. High levels of torture and forced disappearances continued."

After years of US training and military build up, last year, the Colombian army launched the largest military operation in modern Colombian history, which, according to the New York Times, was designed "to make potentially oil-rich regions safe for exploration by private companies and the government-run oil company." Civilians bore the brunt of that operation as evidenced by a startling 38 percent increase in the number of Colombians forcibly displaced, from 207,607 in 2003 to 287,581 in 2004, according to the Consultancy for Human Rights and Displacement.

The guerrillas took a page out of Muhammad Ali's book, and played "rope a dope" with the government forces during the offensive. That is, the Colombian guerrillas withdrew to the jungle, but, since the beginning of this year, they have launched a fierce counter-offensive. This counter-offensive demonstrates that the guerrillas are far from being militarily defeated, and belies US and Colombian officials' claims of victory on the battlefield.

Instead of funding military offensives, the US could be promoting peace through a political solution. After 40 years of intermittent warfare, it obvious that any solution to the conflict needs to address its roots, such as land redistribution to the peasants and opening up the oligarchic political process.

In sum, the US could find more productive ways to spend $4 billion than funding Colombian military operations to secure potential oilfields. These funds could meet social needs at home by preventing drug abuse through education and treatment. And, instead of providing an impetus for war in Colombia, US policy could encourage a peaceful settlement to the long-standing civil war.

After five years of Plan Colombia, the US should adopt a policy that would benefit both Americans and Colombians rather repeat the same policy over and over and expect different results.

David Martin is a member of the newly-formed Austin Andean Solidarity Action Project (Austin ASAP). In 2000, he led a campaign against Plan Colombia in Colorado as the director of the Denver Justice and Peace Committee.

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